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NOTE
CARLSON V. STATE AND THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE: THE ALASKA WRINKLE
IN NONRESIDENT FISHING FEE
DIFFERENTIALS
Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a state can charge nonresident commercial fishermen more for commercial fishing fees
where the state shows the differential merely compensates the state
for expenditures from resident-only taxes. In Carlson v. State, the
Alaska Supreme Court held that certain funds used for fisheries
expenses were the analytical equivalent of resident-only taxes because the money was raised by the state from oil revenues. This
Note argues that the unique structure of the Alaska state economy
in its use of oil revenues creates a wrinkle in the Federal Privileges
and Immunities Clause.

I. INTRODUCTION
When people hear that I am a member of the Alaska Law Review, the most frequently asked question is “Why is the Alaska
Law Review at Duke University?” Inevitably, the question that
follows is “Why does Alaska need a review of its law?” One could
argue that every state should have its own publication where legislators can debate with the practitioners to hash out legal issues.
However, Alaska has a unique need for a law review because of its
1
inherent “differentness” from the contiguous states. First, even
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though Alaska is one of the least populous states in the union, it is
2
the largest and the richest in natural resources. The overwhelming
presence of the oil industry in Alaska affects Alaska’s economic
3
structure, environmental laws, and tax system. Second, Alaska is a
relatively new state and therefore does not have the same depth of
4
legal precedent possessed by many other states. Finally, after the
oil industry boom during the 1970s, the State created the Alaska
Permanent Fund, which gathers a percentage of annual oil revenues and reinvests the money, distributing dividends to residents,
5
and paying for economic development within the state. Even beyond the Permanent Fund, oil revenues make up approximately
6
eighty percent of the state’s economy, making Alaska unique
among other states in that “most of [the] costs of state government
(including fisheries management) come from oil revenues belong7
ing to only residents.” In Carlson v. State, Commercial Fisheries
1. S. Michael Gray, Can State Regulation of Renewable Electricity Achieve
Discriminatory Effects on Interstate Trade without Triggering the Dormant Commerce Clause?, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 783, 790-91 (2003).
2. Id. at 790.
3. Id. at 791.
4. See David G. Stebing, Insurance Regulation in Alaska: Healthy Exercise of
a State Prerogative, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 296 n.76 (1993) ( “As a young state,
Alaska has had the benefit of drawing upon legislation which evolved through the
hard work of other states.”); James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 779 n.64 (1993) (omitting Alaska from
the study because it was a young state unlikely to “have had the time necessary to
develop a substantial body of constitutional law”).
5. See generally Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., An Alaskan’s Guide to the
Permanent Fund at 6-7 (2001), available at http://www.apfc.org/library/
2001guide.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
6. ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, TAX DIVISION, REVENUE SOURCE
BOOK, FALL 2003 2 (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.tax.state.ak.us/ sourcesbook/2003/fall2003/f03index.htm (“Oil revenues continue to dominate the revenue
picture—providing over 80% of Unrestricted General Purpose Revenue.”); see
also Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Alaska 1990) [hereinafter Carlson I]
(noting that Alaska derived 86% of its revenues from oil production in 1986).
Only Louisiana has comparable reliance on oil revenues. See Louisiana MidContinent Oil and Gas Association, LA Oil & Gas Industry Overview, at
http://www.lmoga.com/home.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2004) (“The direct taxes and
royalties paid by the industry to the state, along with fees and other taxes account
for approximately 13 percent of all the general fund revenues collected by the
state. At one time the industry accounted for nearly 40 percent of all state general
fund revenues.”).
7. E-mail from Steve White, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources
Section, State of Alaska, and counsel for the State in Carlson (Jan. 12, 2004) (on
file with author).
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Entry Commission, the oil revenues serve to create another legal
issue unique to Alaska: a wrinkle in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
This Note addresses how the Alaska Supreme Court dealt with
the unique nature of the Alaska state economy within the strictures
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The court allowed the
State to charge nonresident commercial fishermen more for commercial fishing fees than resident commercial fishermen as long as
the fee differential merely compensated the State for the added
expense of the nonresidents or balanced out expenses borne by
8
residents to which nonresidents do not contribute. Part I of the
Note looks at the long procedural road the case has taken and explains the holdings of each case. Part II examines how the Privileges and Immunities Clause limits discriminatory licensing fees
such as the one at question in Carlson. Part III explains the importance of oil revenues to the Alaska government and why Alaska
residents have a personal stake in the spending of oil revenues. Finally, Part IV examines how Alaska’s economy creates a wrinkle in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, allowing Alaska to charge
nonresident fishermen more than residents.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carlson has been before the Alaska Supreme Court three
times and has twice been denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme
9
Court. The case has a long and complicated history that began
when the Alaska legislature amended its commercial fishing license
law to provide that “[t]he amount of an annual fee for a nonresident shall be three times the amount of the annual fee for a resi10
dent.” The 3:1 ratio was developed through state statutes, ad-

8. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1275, 1278.
9. Carlson v. State, 65 P.3d 851, 853 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S.
Ct. 387 (2003) [hereinafter Carlson III]; Carlson v. State, 919 P.2d 1337, 1339
(Alaska 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1101 (1997) [hereinafter Carlson II]; Carlson
I, 798 P.2d at 1275, 1278. In both the duration of the case and the tremendous
number of motions filed, rulings made, and opinions written, Carlson mirrors
Dicken’s infamous Jarndyce and Jarndyce. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
(Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1853). However, in Carlson, the parties and courts, unlike the unruly Court of Chancery, have stayed focused on the
ultimate issue—whether Alaska’s differential fishing fee is unconstitutional—and
have spent the twenty years that the case has been pending by narrowing the
scope of the case from the larger constitutional questions to the factual questions
of the state’s budgetary expenses.
10. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.160(b) (Michie 1983), repealed by § 7 ch. 27, SLA
2001; see also Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1271. Currently, “a nonresident engaged in
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ministrative regulations, and attorney general opinions.11 The State
also required that vessel owners buy a limited entry permit which
“control[s] . . . the number of people who can fish in a given geographic area,” again charging nonresident vessel owners three
12
times the amount of resident vessel owners.
In 1983, a group of nonresident fishermen sued the State,
claiming that the differential fees violated the Commerce Clause
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitu13
tion. The group formed a class that included “all persons who
participated in one or more Alaska commercial fisheries at any
time who paid non-resident assessments to the State for commer14
cial or gear licenses or permits.”
A. Carlson I
In Carlson I, the State moved for summary judgment, claiming
that the 3:1 ratio did not violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Commerce Clause because the “fee ratio partially
reimburses the State for that portion of the costs of fisheries management, enforcement and conservation attributable to nonresi15
dents.” The State included the following in its calculation of the
cost of fisheries management: the annual operating budget of the
16
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (“CFEC”); the percentcommercial fishing . . . shall pay an annual base fee of $60 plus an amount, established by the department by regulation, that is as close as is practicable to the
maximum allowed by law.” ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.480 (Michie 2002).
11. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1270-71.
12. Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 854 & n.5 (citing former 20 ALASKA ADMIN. CODE
§§ 05.240(a)(1), (2), (4) (2002)). For example, in the highest fee class, nonresident
vessel owners paid $750 for an entry permit, while resident vessel owners paid
only $250. Id. Currently, “[t]he fee for a nonresident entry permit . . . shall be
higher than the annual base fee by an amount, established by the commission by
regulation, that is as close as is practicable to the maximum allowed by law.”
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.490. Alaska still requires both commercial licenses and entry permits: “A person engaged in commercial fishing shall obtain a commercial
fishing license. . . . An entry permit . . . entitles the holder to participate as a gear
operator in the fishery for which the permit is issued and to participate as a crewmember in any fishery.” § 16.05.480. As in Carlson, the fishing license and the entry permit are collectively referred to as “commercial fishing fees.” Carlson III, 65
P.3d at 854.
13. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1270.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1272.
16. The CFEC is the organization responsible for issuing commercial fishing
permits. The CFEC “is an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory agency responsible for promoting the sustained yield management of Alaska’s fishery resources
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age of the operating budget of the Department of Public Safety attributable to the amount of money spent on commercial fisheries
enforcement; and the annual operating budget of the Department
of Fish and Game for both the Division of Commercial Fisheries
17
(“DCF”) and the Fisheries Rehabilitation Enhancement and De18
The State then determined
velopment Division (“FREDD”).
what percentage of these expenditures was attributable to nonresi19
dent fishermen. According to the State’s calculations, the 3:1 ratio was actually favorable to nonresidents because if the State had
taken into account the per capita amount of fish caught by nonresi20
dents, the fee differential would have been greater than 3:1. The
class argued that the State should not be able to include all of these
expenses in its calculation, but rather should only take into account
the budget of the CFEC or, alternatively, should also take into account “all sources of revenue to the State attributable to the non21
resident commercial fishermen.”
The superior court held that the 3:1 fee ratio violated neither
22
the Privileges and Immunities nor the Commerce Clauses. Based
on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court held that the
State had a permissible reason for discriminating against nonresidents: “to have the non-resident[s] pay a part of their fair share of
the costs of enforcement, management and conservation of the
fisheries of this State, which costs are largely borne by the residents
23
through general fund expenditures.” Based on the Commerce
Clause, the superior court held that the “legitimate local purpose”—balancing the costs paid by residents and nonresidents in
and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing by regulating entry
into the fisheries in the public interest.” Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.cfec.state.ak.us/faq/whatcfec.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2004).
17. The DCF determines the amount of fish “available each year for commercial harvesting.” Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1272.
18. The FREDDD is responsible for “rehabilitat[ing] and enhanc[ing] fisheries by determining where and when fish are needed or wanted to be, and then
producing the fish at that time and place.” Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1272 n.3. “Resident commercial fishers are paying the license and
permit fees they are charged plus their per capita share of oil revenues which are
diverted to fisheries management from other benefits or State services.” Carlson
III, 65 P.3d 851, 856 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003).
21. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1272 (quotation omitted). This number would include federal benefits that Alaska receives from the nonresident commercial fishermen. Id. at 1272-73.
22. Id. at 1273.
23. Id.
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commercial fisheries—and the fact that the differential was the
least restrictive means to satisfy that purpose justified the discrimi24
nation against interstate commerce. Therefore, the 3:1 ratio was
25
upheld.
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court deci26
sion. Because commercial fishing came within the scope of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the court held that the State had
to show “a substantial reason for the discrimination, and whether
27
the 3:1 fee ratio bears a sufficiently close relationship to the goal.”
The court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Toomer
28
v. Witsell, which held that a 100:1 differential fee for fishing licenses violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause because
South Carolina did not prove the extra cost to the nonresident was
justified by the “added enforcement burden” imposed on the State
by nonresident fishermen or for expenditures “from taxes which
29
only residents pay.” The Court stated, “[N]othing in the record
indicates that non-residents use larger boats or different fishing
methods than residents, that the cost of enforcing the laws against
them is appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount of the
30
State’s general funds is devoted to [fisheries] conservation.” Fur31
ther, the Alaska court relied on Mullaney v. Anderson, which
stated, “[C]onstitutional issues affecting taxation do not turn on
even approximate mathematical determinations. But something
more is required than [a] bald assertion to establish a reasonable
32
relation between the higher fees and the higher cost to [Alaska].”
The court noted that the amount of support needed to “demonstrate a sufficiently ‘close connection’ to a legitimate state purpose”
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1274. The court further held (after the State provided additional
evidence of its commercial fishery expenses) that there was no material question
of fact “regarding the accuracy of the state’s calculations.” Id.
26. Id. at 1278.
27. Id. at 1274 (“Commercial fishing is a sufficiently important activity to
come within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and license fees
which discriminate against nonresidents are prima facie a violation of it.”) (citations omitted).
28. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
29. Id. at 398-99.
30. Id. (emphasis added by the Alaska Supreme Court in Carlson I, 798 P.2d
at 1275). The argument that the State uses a substantial amount of its general
fund becomes important in the context of Alaska’s dependency on oil revenues, as
a large part of the “general fund” is used by Alaska to pay for fisheries management. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1273.
31. 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
32. Id. at 418.
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is unclear.33 The analysis under the Commerce Clause was “quite
34
similar” and the court concluded again that the State would have
to give more proof regarding the burden placed on it to justify the
35
fee differential.
The court determined that the record did not contain enough
information to determine whether the 3:1 ratio was excessive and
36
remanded for further investigation. The court gave guidelines to
the lower court for determining the correct differential:
The language of Toomer to the effect that it would be permissible “to charge nonresidents a differential which would merely
compensate the state . . . for any conservation expenditures from
taxes which only residents pay” requires additional discussion.
We read this statement to mean that if nonresident fishermen
paid the same taxes as Alaskans and these taxes were substantially the sole revenue source for the state out of which conservation expenditures were made, then differential fees would not be
permissible. That, however, is not the case in Alaska where a very
high proportion of total state revenues are derived from petroleum
37
production.

Therefore, the court explained,
It would be correct to say that eighty-six cents of each dollar
spent for conservation came from state revenue sources to which
nonresident fishermen made no contribution. These revenues
could have been used to benefit residents through various other
programs and they are, analytically, equivalent to taxes which
38
only residents pay.

The court stated that the issue on remand was whether the fees and
taxes paid by a nonresident “are substantially equal to those which
must be paid by similarly situated residents when the residents’ pro
rata shares of state revenues to which nonresidents make no con39
tribution are taken into account.”
B. Carlson II
On remand, each party developed a different method for
comparing the fees paid versus the expenditures from state revenue
to which the nonresidents did not contribute. The class’ method

33. Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1275.
34. Id. at 1276.
35. Id. at 1278.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added). The court continued, “[f]or example, in fiscal year
1986, eighty-six percent of state revenues were so derived.” Id.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.; see also Carlson II, 919 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Alaska 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1101 (1997).
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was a per capita formula that “computes the contribution made by
each resident to the cost of maintaining the commercial fisheries
40
and compares this with the fee differential.” The State’s per rata
formula compared “the total contributions made to the cost of
commercial fisheries by residents to the total fees paid by nonresi41
dents.”
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the class’ per
capita formula was the appropriate method of determining whether
42
the Privileges and Immunities Clause had been violated. Under
the class’ formula, “the resident contribution can be compared to
the difference in fees paid by nonresidents to determine if the fee
43
differential is constitutional.” “[I]f the superior court finds that
the fee differential is not greater than the resident contribution, the
State has successfully carried its burden of proving that the means
employed by its statutory scheme are substantially related to the
44
legitimate interest served by the statute.” The lower court was
also instructed to determine whether it should consider additional
costs that the State sought to include in the calculation of total ex45
penditures.
Further, the court held that the Commerce Clause was not implicated in the fee differential: “Unlike the fee differentials in Ore46
47
gon Waste Systems and Chemical Waste, the fee differentials at

40. Carlson II, 919 P.2d at 1339. The equation to determine each resident’s
per capita share of the fisheries budget was [Fisheries Budget/Alaska Population]
x [Percentage of State Budget from Oil Revenue]. Id. at 1343. This number
would then be compared to the nonresident license fee. Id. If the difference between the nonresident fee and the resident’s share was greater than 3:1, then the
fee differential violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 1346.
41. Id. at 1339. The superior court accepted the State’s calculation and found
that the amount paid by residents in “taxes (or their analytical equivalent)” exceeded the amounts paid by nonresidents and that, therefore, the fee differential
did not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id.
42. Id. at 1342-43 (“To establish ‘practical equality’ between residents and
nonresidents, the State must demonstrate that the higher fees charged nonresidents are equivalent to the burden borne by residents as measured by the ‘residents’ pro rata shares of state revenues to which nonresidents make no contribution.’”) (quoting Carlson I, 798 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Alaska 1990)).
43. Carlson II, 919 P.2d at 1343.
44. Id. at 1344.
45. Id.
46. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994) (holding surcharge on disposal of out-of-state waste violated Commerce
Clause); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 5.3.6, 427 (2d
ed. 2002).
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issue in this case are not predicated upon the movement of articles
of commerce across state lines, but rather upon the residency status
of those applying for permits,” which, under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, is analyzed under either the Privileges
48
and Immunities or Equal Protection clauses.
C. Carlson III
Carlson III dealt with what expenditures the State was allowed
to count in its fisheries budget.49 On remand from Carlson II, the
lower court determined that the State could count both direct and
indirect expenditures, but not “general government costs, capital
costs, the hatcheries loan fund subsidy, and forgone revenue from
50
fishery resources.” The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that both direct and indirect operating expenses could be included “because without the direct operating expenditures the in-

47. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-44 (1992) (holding
that state law requiring out-of-state companies to pay a hazardous waste disposal
fee but not requiring the same of in-state companies violated the Commerce
Clause); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, § 5.3.6, at 426-27.
48. Carlson II, 919 P.2d at 1340-41. But see id. at 1346 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (stating the U.S. Supreme Court “has, in fact, endorsed the methodology
of referring to Commerce Clause precedent in deciding claims based solely on the
Privileges and Immunities Clause”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, § 5.5, at 446
(“The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
overlap: Both can be used to challenge state and local laws that discriminate
against out-of-staters. In fact, the Supreme Court has spoken of the ‘mutually reinforcing relationship’ between the dormant commerce clause and the privileges
and immunities clause.”) (citing Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978)).
However, because the Alaska Supreme Court continues to use the Privileges
and Immunities Clause to determine the constitutionality of the nonresident fee
differentials, this Note will not discuss Commerce Clause implications of the issue
at length. For analysis of Carlson under the Commerce Clause, see Winkfield F.
Twyman, Jr., Losing Face but Gaining Power: State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 16 VA. TAX REV. 347, 448-50 (Winter 1997). Twyman argues:
Without significant gains in Alaska’s local interests as trustee and
guardian of fishing rights, the fee differential should be struck down under the dormant Commerce Clause. The clear costs to a developed division of power between states and the federal government outweigh uncertain gains in state trusteeship and localism. The Alaskan fee scheme
goes too far against ordered relations in power.
Id. at 449-50.
49. Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851, 853 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct.
387 (2003). The court also reaffirmed its Carlson II ruling regarding the Privileges
and Immunities Clause and Commerce Clause, id. at 859-63, and ruled that the
class was due a refund of the fee differential were the class to prevail, id. at 875.
50. Id. at 858.
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direct operating expenditures would not have been generated.”51
The court then ruled on the other figures that the State wanted to
include in the determination of the fisheries budget. The court
ruled that the State could include the following:
(1) Capital costs directly supporting commercial fishing, e.g.
boat harbors and salmon hatcheries, but only as far as they
52
are not counted in the direct operating expenditures;
(2) Hatchery loan fund subsidies, which loan money to fish enhancement projects, because “the loan subsidy represents
forgone revenues that the State could otherwise spend at
53
present value;” and
54
(3) Interest income deposited into state savings accounts.

However, the court ruled that the State could not include the following:
(1) Forgone revenues from commercial fishery resources because “[t]he State cannot recoup from nonresidents the
possible revenue it forgoes in making policy decisions re55
garding its fisheries management;” or
(2) General governmental expenditures, e.g., correction, health
care, and education, because, “[w]hile in economic terms
the State may bear much of the cost of government generated by the fishing industry, this does not translate into a legal justification for including these costs in the fisheries ex56
penditures.”

In the three trips this case made before the Alaska Supreme
Court, the court has determined that a fee differential in fishing licenses does not per se violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause; decided that the formula used to determine the acceptable
fee differential was a per capita, rather than a pro rata, formula;
and determined what may be included in the State’s determination
of its fisheries budget.
III. THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The Privileges and Immunities Clause states: “The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citi57
zens in the several States.” Under Supreme Court jurisprudence,
this clause limits “the ability of a state to discriminate against out-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 865.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 867-68.
Id. at 868-69.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 866-67.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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of-staters with regard to fundamental rights or important economic
58
activities.” Usually, such discrimination, as in Carlson, affects a
59
nonresident’s “ability to earn a livelihood.” In fact, the Privileges
60
and Immunities Clause protects fundamental economic rights.
These rights, including “the rights of trade, commerce, and pursuit
of a livelihood[,] . . . get strong interstate equality protection, even
though the Constitution gives them almost no substantive protec61
tion.” A state’s restriction of nonresident activity triggers the
Privileges and Immunities Clause if “the activity in question is sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation as to fall within the
purview of the clauses, and if it is not closely related to the ad62
vancement of a substantial state interest.” The first part of the
test looks at the fundamental nature of the activity; once the activity has been determined to be fundamental, the state has the burden of showing a substantial interest and a reasonable fit.
Licensing fees are one area in which states often try to differentiate between residents and nonresidents by charging more for
the latter. Often states cite as a justification that taxes paid by
residents go to manage whatever the license limits. For example, in
the case of fishing licenses, a state might argue the residents have
to pay for nature conservancy and enforcement through their taxes,
while nonresidents are able to take advantage of these without

58. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 46, § 5.5, at 445.
59. Id. at 446; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (“[I]t was
long ago decided that one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens
of State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with
the citizens of that State.”).
60. For examples of what the Court considers fundamental rights, see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 70 (1988) (holding state residency requirement for bar admittance unconstitutional); Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (finding residency requirements for
practice of law violated clause); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526, (1978)
(holding an Alaska law requiring preference for residents in hiring for oil production violated clause); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1975)
(finding that a state tax on nonresident commuter income unconstitutional).
61. David Schmudde, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Nonresident Citizens, 1999 LAW REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 95, 115 (“A right can be
fundamental for privileges and immunities purposes even though it is not a fundamental right. It is fundamental because a compelling interest would be required
to override it for citizens and non-citizens alike. Thus, all the rights of trade,
commerce, and pursuit of a livelihood are fundamental rights for this purpose.”).
62. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 758 (1998); see also Carlson I, 798
P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990) (citing Supreme Court of Virginia, 487 U.S. at 6465). The state also has to choose the least restrictive means available. Id.
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paying proportional costs.63 By allowing nonresidents access to the
state’s resources, the state arguably has increased expenses with no
64
appreciable return of costs from the nonresidents. On the other
hand, the problems affecting nonresidents caused by these discriminatory fee differentials are obvious. First, nonresidents have
no power to vote on the issues and, therefore, no means of de65
manding change in the fee structure. Further, if one state levies a
licensing fee that greatly discriminates against nonresidents, the
surrounding states will be more likely to do the same, leading to
66
“border wars” and inefficient interstate commerce. The Supreme
Court has held that commercial fishing is a “sufficiently basic” activity that is protected under the Privileges and Immunities
67
Clause; therefore, such “license fees which discriminate against
68
nonresidents are prima facie a violation of it.”
63. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 397 (stating South Carolina’s “obvious purpose
was to conserve its shrimp supply, and the state suggests that the fee structure was
designed to head off an impending threat of excessive trawling”); Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851 (Alaska), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003) (No. 03-73) (“If residents and nonresidents were charged an identical fee, the residents would pay more than the nonresidents for those services when their proportionate tax payments for the same
services are taken into account.”).
64. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-18 (1952) (“The Tax Commissioner relied on the higher cost of enforcing the license law against nonresident
fishermen to justify the difference in fees . . . .”); see also Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398
(noting that South Carolina cited the “allegedly greater cost of enforcing the laws
against” nonresidents).
65. Schmudde, supra note 61, at 115 (“The Clause must be upheld by federal
courts in providing the constitutional guarantee of fairness in treatment from
other states. Without such an interpretation, the nonresident is ‘fair game’ for the
taxing state.”).
66. Id. at 115-16 (“This discriminatory taxation leads to border wars. If one
state treats the citizens of another state in an unfair manner, the response of the
other states has been to enact retaliatory taxes. This results in economic inefficiencies and barriers to work and trade. This is the exact problem that the Privileges and Immunities Clause should be used to avoid.”).
67. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 417-18; Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403 (“[C]ommercial
shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”). In contrast, the Supreme Court held that
sport hunting is not sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nonresident to merit
protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978); see also 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS &
ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 18:13 (2003)
(“Commercial wildlife harvesting is a constitutionally protected endeavor, but
sport hunting is not.”).
68. Carlson I, 798 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Alaska 1990).
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The two major Supreme Court cases on fishing fees and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Toomer v. Witsell and Mullaney
69
v. Anderson, involved a higher licensing fee for nonresidents. According to these cases, a state may charge a nonresident more for a
fishing license than a resident in order to compensate the state for
added expenses for conservation and enforcement or to compen70
sate residents for taxes that only they pay. “However, a state may
not impose a differential on nonresidents which bears no relation
to such factors, and is merely intended to discriminate against non71
residents in favor of residents . . . . ” In both cases, the Supreme
Court found that, though a differential could theoretically be constitutional, the states had not provided enough evidence that the
differential represented some real added cost to the state borne
only by residents. In Mullaney, the Court held:
[T]here is no warrant for the assumption that the differential in
fees bears any relation to this difference in cost, nothing to indicate that it ‘would merely compensate’ for the added enforcement burden. . . . What evidence we have negatives the idea of
any such relation, for the total amount payable by nonresident
fishermen in 1949-1950, in excess of what they would have been
charged if they had been residents, may easily have exceeded the
entire amount available for administration of the Tax Commis72
sioner’s office in that year.

Similarly, in Toomer, South Carolina did not produce sufficient
evidence to show that
the cost of enforcing the laws against [nonresidents] is appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount of the State’s general
funds is devoted to shrimp conservation. But assuming such
69. South Carolina charged a 100:1 fee differential, Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395,
and Alaska charged a 10:1 differential, Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 416.
70. 36A C.J.S. Fish § 28 (2003) (citing Toomer, 334 U.S. at 397) (“But [the
clause] does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where
there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it. Thus the inquiry in each case
must be concerned with whether such reasons do exist and whether the degree of
discrimination bears a close relation to them.”).
71. 36A C.J.S. Fish § 28 (citing Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398-99) (stating that the
court has to “conclude[] that there was a reasonable relationship between the
danger represented by non-citizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them” by the 100:1 fee differential). A statute that did not “provide for
the licensing of commercial fishing boats owned and operated by nonresidents,
with the exception of those vessels owned and operated by bona fide residents of
states with which the State of Louisiana has a reciprocal agreement” violated the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Gospodonovich v. Clements, 108 F. Supp. 234,
236 (D. La. 1951). Though Louisiana did provide that nonresidents could get a
license for $2,500, no such license had ever been issued. Id.
72. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 418.
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were the facts, they would not necessarily support a remedy so
drastic as to be a near equivalent of total exclusion73 [of nonresident fishermen caused by the 100:1 fee differential].

A more recent case regarding fee differentials is Tangier
74
Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt. In Tangier Sound, a group of
Maryland fisherman claimed that a Virginia law, which tripled nonresident commercial fisherman’s harvester license fees, violated the
75
Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Fourth Circuit held that
the fee differential violated the Clause because the evidence did
not show that the differential merely compensated Virginia for
added enforcement and conservation costs which, otherwise, only
76
residents would pay. The court noted that “such a higher tax or
fee may be imposed on the nonresident if the purpose of that
higher tax or fee is to place the burden so that it will bear as nearly
77
as possible equally upon all resident and nonresident [citizens].”
It is very difficult for a discriminatory local law to pass the
substantial interest test. While the Supreme Court has not man73. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398.
74. 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 265-66 (“The $1,150 fee was computed by dividing the total expenses
for fisheries management and research in 1989-90 by the number of resident
commercial fishermen.”).
76. Id. at 267 (“The additional fee imposed on the nonresidents as computed
does not reach to the goal of equality of treatment between resident and nonresident.”).
77. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Further, the method used by a state to
determine the relative costs becomes very important when looking toward the
fairness of a fee differential. In Tangier Sound, the court found “the record does
not disclose that the Commonwealth of Virginia has shown that it created any
credible method of allocating costs as between residents and nonresidents which
places the burden equally or approximately equally upon residents and nonresidents.” Id. The importance of the method used is also a key part of the Carlson
case; in fact, Carlson III focuses almost entirely on what the state may include in
its calculations. See Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851, 863-69 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003); Oliver F.C. Murray, Carlson v. State: Fair Fees for Fishing Far from Home, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 157, 163-64 (1999).
The Tangier Sound Waterman’s Association also filed an amicus brief with
the Supreme Court when the Carlson plaintiffs filed for certiorari after the Alaska
Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson III. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and a Brief of the Tangier Sound Waterman’s Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of the Petition, 2003 WL 22428534, Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851
(Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 387 (2003). The association requested
that the court grant certiorari due to the widespread problem of discriminatory
nonresident commercial fishing fees and argued that the Alaska Supreme Court
decision contradicted Supreme Court decisions on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 4-12.
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dated a compelling interest test for Privileges and Immunities re78
view, “it has come close.” The Court “has invalidated much of
79
the local discrimination” under the substantial interest test. In
fact, the author has been unable to find a case, aside from Carlson,
in which a court found that a state law creating a fee differential
between residents and nonresidents involved a fundamental right
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but was so related to a
80
substantial state interest as to validate the discrimination. The
78. Schmudde, supra note 61, at 118.
79. Id. at 118 n.130 (citing discriminatory local laws that the Supreme Court
has invalidated under the substantial interest test and earlier models of that test).
However, Schmudde does note that there are two exceptions to the nondiscriminatory rule: (1) “each state can reserve the exercise of governmental
power, including the right to vote, to its own citizens;” and (2) states may limit
subsidized social welfare services, such as welfare or in-state tuition, to its citizens.
Id. at 123-24. Further, as James Kushner notes,
the standards are not, however, absolute. A state may not impose an income tax exclusively on nonresident commuters or emigrating residents,
and a city might not be able to offer public employment to its own state
and city residents, or prefer local vendors, but a state may impose greater
restrictions on or charge significantly higher fees for nonresident hunting
licenses, recreation access, or boat mooring, or provide other resident
hunting preferences, prefer resident estate administrators, limit dumping
access to public landfills, limit parking to city residents, and excluding
nonresidents from state insurance programs, limit compensation for
crime victims to state residents, or limit subsidy and assistance programs
to its residents, place limits on the exportation of natural resources or
generated utilities, and limit gun permits or limit notice to next of kin of
ward in guardianship proceedings to county residents, because the clause
is limited to fundamental rights, such as medical services, the right to be
free from higher taxes, and the right to a livelihood, as in the case of employment or professional licensing, such as licensing to practice law.
JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
AND LITIGATION § 6:12 (2003) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
80. But see Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v. Idaho Outfitters and Guides Bd.,
709 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (determining that the fee differential
for outfitter and guide licenses was valid under the Commerce Clause because
“the license fee differential is too small to have anything but an incidental effect
on interstate commerce,” and noting that plaintiffs did not raise the Privileges and
Immunities issue); Broeckl v. Chicago Park Dist., 544 N.E.2d 792, 796 (Ill. 1989)
(upholding a law allowing for higher mooring fees for non-Chicago residents because the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prohibit intrastate differential
fees); 44 Or. Op. Att’y Gen 407, at *5-6 (1985) (stating that an Oregon law
charged nonresidents seeking outfitter and guide licenses more only if they were
residents of a state that imposed similar discriminatory fees against nonresidents
and that the act was constitutional because it “does not involve the type of discrimination which the Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed to prevent”
in that it attempted “to remove barriers to out-of-state business by Oregon outfitters and guides”).
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Carlson exception comes from the unique position of the Alaskan
economy: specifically, the important role that oil revenues play in
the funding of fishing services.
IV. ALASKA’S OIL REVENUE STRUCTURE
When Alaska drafted its constitution in 1955-56, one of the
problems facing the State was the drain of natural resources out of
the state; nonresidents were often responsible for developing those
81
resources, so they benefited from the money generated. To retain
the benefits of these resources for residents, the constitution included the following requirement: “The legislature shall provide
for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the state, including land and water, for the
82
maximum benefit of its people.” To facilitate this requirement,
the general fund created a depository for the “proceeds of sales,
fees, rents, royalties or other receipts from the land paid to the
state . . . and the legislature may provide for payments in lieu of
83
taxes to local governments.” These proceeds are paid to the State
because “all land in the state and all minerals not previously appropriated [as of February 21, 1983] are the exclusive property of
the people of the state and the state holds title to the land and min84
erals in trust for the people of the state.”
During the 1960’s-70’s, Alaska saw an increase in state revenues generated by oil production. In 1969, the State auctioned drill
85
rights to the state-owned land at Prudhoe Bay. “This lease sale
not only provided the state with an immediate $900 million, it also,
for the long term, put the state into the oil exploration and devel86
opment business with the winning oil companies as its partners.”
Because of the growth of the oil industry and the money earned by
the State of Alaska, “oil revenues have paid for most of the state
81. Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., supra note 5, at 4-5. The Permanent Fund
Corporation was established to “manage and invest the assets of the permanent
fund.” ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.040 (Michie 2002).
82. ALASKA CONST. art VIII, § 2.
83. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.504 (Michie 2002). The general fund holds “all
money the state receives that is not specifically designated to go into one of the
other accounts of the state,” such as the Permanent Fund. The Institute of Social
and Economic Research, The Alaska Citizen’s Guide to the Budget, § 6.3 General
Fund (updated Dec. 12, 2003), at http://citizensguide.uaa.alaska.edu/
6.STATE_ASSETS/6.3_general_funds.htm (last visited February 27, 2004) (hereinafter “Alaska Citizen’s Guide”).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.502.
85. Alaska Permanent Fund Corp., supra note 5, at 1.
86. Id.
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and a large share of the local government expenditures benefiting
87
both Alaska businesses and households.”
The structure of the budget puts the State in a different position from other states where “[b]usiness and household taxes and
fees paid by the new business and its workers are sufficient to pay
88
for the public services.” In light of the fact that “a very high proportion of total state revenues are derived from petroleum produc89
tion,” and because these revenues are held “in trust for the people
90
of the state,” the citizens have a more proprietal interest in the
revenues earned by the State through oil revenues. The Alaska
Supreme Court stated the oil revenues “could have been used to
benefit residents through various other programs and they are,
91
analytically, equivalent to ‘taxes which only residents pay.’” Oil
revenues “prevent[] citizens from having to pay state income or
92
sales taxes.” That oil production outweighs all other sources of
state revenue means that a much higher proportion of state expenditures are made through revenues that belong only to Alaska residents. “Because a high and identifiable percentage of that fund . . .
comes from petroleum revenues, i.e., from taxes and royalties generated by oil and gas production in Alaska[, t]hose Alaska petroleum revenues belong totally to Alaskans—non-Alaskans have no
93
personal stake in them.” Therefore, an Alaska resident has more
of a proprietary interest in how much Alaska pays for fisheries
management than, for example, an Alabama resident may have in
the money spent on wild duck conservation.
V. CARLSON V. STATE AND THE PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES WRINKLE
A. Does Carlson violate the rules established in Toomer?
Aside from Carlson, all other cases where a state charged a
nonresident in pursuit of a livelihood or some other fundamental
87. Alaska Citizen’s Guide, § 11.1 The Alaska Disconnect, at http://citizens
guide.uaa.alaska.edu/11.BUDGET_FAQs/11.1_AK_Disconnect_FAQ.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2004).
88. Id.
89. Carlson I, 798 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Alaska 1990).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.502.
91. Id.
92. Samantha K. Sherman, Information is Alaska’s Greatest Untapped Resource, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 215, 233 (2001).
93. Email from Steve White, Assistant Attorney General, Natural Resources
Section, Alaska, and counsel for Alaska in Carlson (Jan. 15, 2004) (on file with
author).
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right a differential fee have ended with the statute being declared
94
unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Because Carlson appears to be a departure from this trend, some
might argue that the Alaska Supreme Court got it wrong, that the
3:1 fishing fee differential is in fact a flagrant violation of the rules
95
established in Toomer. According to Justice Brennan,
Toomer held that a classification based on the fact of noncitizenship was constitutionally infirm “unless there is something to indicate that non-citizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at
which the statute is aimed.” Moreover, even where the problem
the State is attempting to remedy is linked to the presence or activity of nonresidents in the State, the Clause requires that there
be ‘a reasonable relationship between the danger represented by
non-citizens, as a class, and the . . . discrimination practiced upon
96
them.’

If one assumes that the Supreme Court would take a more restrictive view of Toomer, as Justice Brennan did in the above passage,
an argument could be made that Alaska has not proven that nonresident fishermen are an evil to the state and that the fee differential is not reasonably related to correcting that evil.
However, it is important to note that Justice Brennan was a
dissenter in Toomer and that the test in Toomer is expressed in
positive terms: a state may have discriminatory fees if the discrimination “merely compensate[s]” the state or equates to a tax which
97
only residents pay. Toomer states that the state may “charge nonresidents a differential that would merely compensate the State for
any added enforcement burden they may impose or for any con98
servation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay.” As
the Alaska Supreme Court stated, “[N]either the Commerce
Clause nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevented the im99
position of an increased fee for nonresident commercial fishers.”
This view of a positive test was also articulated by the Fourth Circuit when they stated that a differential fee “may be imposed on
the nonresident if the object of that higher tax or fee is to place the
94. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948); Tangier Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264,
267 (4th Cir. 1993).
95. But see Murray, supra note 77, at 168-70 (approving of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson II).
96. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 400 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398-99).
97. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 399.
98. Id.; see also Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 417.
99. Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851, 856 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct.
387 (2003).
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burden so that it will bear as nearly as possible equally upon all
100
[residents and nonresidents].”
It is also possible to distinguish Carlson from Toomer and its
progeny on the facts. One factual distinction between the previous
101
cases and Carlson is the size of the fee differential. In Toomer,
South Carolina was charging nonresident fishermen one hundred
102
In Mullaney, Alaska was
times more than resident fishermen.
103
charging nonresidents ten times more. In the more recent Tangier Sound, Virginia was charging nonresidents an extra $1,150 for a
commercial fisherman’s harvester’s license on top of those fees
104
In contrast to these
paid both by residents and nonresidents.
cases, the fee differential in Carlson was only 3:1. For fishing licenses, residents paid $30 for the license and nonresidents paid $90
and, for entry permits, residents paid between $50 and $250 and
nonresidents paid between $150 and $750, depending on the fee
105
class. The total difference between the most expensive commercial fishing fee for residents and nonresidents is $560, half the difference of Tangier Sound.

100. Tangier Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 1993)
(internal quotation omitted).
101. Seemingly, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, any unjustified fee
differential would violate the Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (“It
was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each
State upon the same footing with citizens of other States . . .”). Under Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the impact of a fee differential on interstate commerce is an
essential inquiry. See Grand Canyon Dories, Inc. v. Idaho Outfitters and Guides
Bd., 709 F.2d 1250, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding no Commerce Clause violation
where “the license fee differential is too small to have anything but an incidental
effect on interstate commerce”). However, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that
the State need only show “practical equality” to pass Privileges and Immunities
scrutiny. Carlson II, 919 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Alaska 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1101
(1997). If the State demonstrates that “the means employed by its statute have a
substantial enough relationship to the [statute’s] legitimate interest to survive
Privileges and Immunities review,” then the State must show only a “reasonable
relation between the higher fees and the higher cost.” Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 863
(quoting Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 418).
102. Toomer, 334 U.S. 395.
103. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 416.
104. Tangier Sound, 4 F.3d at 265-66 (noting that “[i]n addition to this nonresident harvester’s license fee, nonresident commercial fishermen are also required
to pay all of the license fees applicable to resident commercial fishermen.”).
105. Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 853-54 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.160(b) (Michie
1983) (amended 1984) (license fees); ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.200-225 (Michie
2000) (entry permit fees)).
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Another way to distinguish Carlson on the facts is by looking
at the weight of the evidence presented by Alaska in the current
106
case. In the three preceding cases, the courts all cited the lack of
evidence that the fee differential “merely compensated” the state
107
or equated fees paid by nonresidents to resident-only taxes.
However, in Carlson, “[t]he record contains a lengthy and detailed
analysis of the revenues and expenditures connected with fisheries
108
In fact, much of the continuing litigation in the
management.”
matter has been over what numbers the State is allowed to use in
its calculation of its annual budget and how the nonresident share
109
is to be determined. The State is not relying on a mere “bald assertion to establish a reasonable relation between the higher fees
and the higher cost to [Alaska]” which the court warns against in
110
Though the Supreme Court also warned,
Mullaney.
“[c]onstitutional issues affecting taxation do not turn on even ap111
proximate mathematical determinations,” it is evident from the
outcome of previous cases that a state needs to provide verifiable
and concrete budgetary evidence that residents and nonresidents
were treated substantially equally. The Alaska court has continually attempted to refine the equation and allowable budgetary
items to determine whether the State is in fact within the strictures
of Toomer:
We should clarify, however, that a refund will only be necessary
if the difference between the actual fees charged to resident and

106. One procedural difference between Carlson and earlier cases is that the
Alaska courts have allowed the State to introduce and refine its evidence of expenditures throughout the case. See, e.g., Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 855 (explaining
that “[b]ecause the appropriateness of a 3:1 fee differential had not been addressed, we remanded the case for such a determination, placing the burden of
persuasion on the State.”).
107. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 418 (stating “[t]here is no warrant for the assumption that the differential in fees bears any relation to this difference in cost, nothing to indicate that it ‘would merely compensate’ for the added enforcement burden”); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398 (stating that “[n]othing in the record indicates . . .
that the cost of enforcing the laws against [nonresidents] is appreciably greater, or
that any substantial amount of the State’s general funds is devoted to shrimp conservation”); Tangier Sound, 4 F.3d at 267 (holding that “[t]he additional fee imposed on the nonresidents as computed does not reach to the goal of equality of
treatment between resident and nonresident . . . [and that n]o evidence before
[them] indicate[d] that this ha[d] been done.”).
108. Carlson I, 798 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1990).
109. Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 863-69; Carlson II, 919 P.2d 1337, 1342-45 (Alaska
1996).
110. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 418.
111. Id.
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nonresident commercial fishers is substantially in excess of the
allowable fee differential indicated by the formula, such that the
actual fees do not bear a reasonable relationship to costs not
otherwise paid by nonresidents. We leave to the superior court
on remand to determine whether proportionality exists in any
112
particular instance and whether a refund is due.

Because Carlson fits within both the legal language of Toomer and
because the facts of the case are distinguishable from the precedent, Carlson is not a violation of the rules established in Toomer.
B. Fitting Carlson within the Toomer test
Because oil revenues are used to fund many of the fisheries
enforcement and conservation, these revenues create a wrinkle in
the Privileges and Immunities Clause that may not exist for other
states. Past differential fee statutes were struck down because the
state could not prove that the residents did in fact pay more than
113
Because of the overwhelming dominance of oil
nonresidents.
revenues in the state’s budget and because those revenues are held
114
“in trust for the people of the state,” the cost to residents is easier
to prove and more direct.
In discussing how the oil revenues interact with the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, several quotes from the cases discussed
above are illustrative. First, in Toomer, the Supreme Court said
that a state had to show that “that the cost of enforcing the laws
against them is appreciably greater, or that any substantial amount
115
of the State’s general funds is devoted to [fisheries] conservation.”
116
The emphasis was added by the Alaska Supreme Court, presumably showing its belief in the importance of the use of the general funds in the fishery-related agencies. Similarly, in Carlson I,
the Alaska Supreme Court read Toomer
to mean that if nonresident fishermen paid the same taxes as
Alaskans and these taxes were substantially the sole revenue
source for the state out of which conservation expenditures were
made, then differential fees would not be permissible. That,
however, is not the case in Alaska where a very high proportion of
117
total state revenues are derived from petroleum production.

The court intimated that because oil production generates so much
of the state’s revenue, the unique economic structure of the state
112. Carlson III, 65 P.3d at 864.
113. Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 418; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398; Tangier
Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 1993).
114. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.502 (Michie 2002).
115. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398.
116. Carlson I, 798 P.2d 1269, 1275 (Alaska 1990).
117. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
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exempts it from the normal application of the Toomer rule. The
court continued: “These revenues could have been used to benefit
residents through various other programs and they are, analyti118
cally, equivalent to ‘taxes which only residents pay.’” Because of
the relationship between the oil revenues and the citizens’ quasi119
ownership of these revenues, using revenues to pay for fisheries
management takes away money directly from the residents of the
state.
The per-capita formula accepted by the Alaska Supreme
Court in Carlson II calculates that “the resident contribution can
be compared to the difference in fees paid by nonresidents to de120
termine if the fee differential is constitutional.” The comparison
is not between what residents paid for licenses versus what nonresidents paid. Rather, the nonresident contribution is compared
to the total expenditures by the State. The “resident contribution”
is all the money paid by residents for licenses and the money forgone by residents in order to cover the additional expenditures of
the fishery agencies, that is the money from the “general funds.”
In determining which expenditures would be allowed in the
State’s calculation of its fisheries budget in Carlson III, the court
separated out expenses that were directly related to fisheries management and ensured that these expenses were not counted elsewhere in the state budget. For example, the State could not include general governmental expenses because while “the State may
bear much of the cost of government generated by the fishing industry, this does not translate into a legal justification for including
121
these costs in the fisheries expenditures.” Further, hatchery loan
subsidies, and other conservation-related efforts, were includable
because they represented “forgone revenues that the State could
122
otherwise spend.” All of these determinations reflect the court’s
desire to determine what exactly the residents of the state are paying into the general funds either by direct payments or by forgone
benefits. The importance of oil revenues in Alaska’s economy creates this unique situation in which money not spent elsewhere
could actually be forgone benefits.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Carlson II, 919 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Alaska 1996).
121. Carlson III, 65 P.3d 851, 866 (Alaska), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 124 S. Ct.
387 (2003).
122. Id. at 867-68.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Because of the lopsided makeup of Alaska’s economy and the
unique place of the oil revenues in the state’s budget, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause is not violated when Alaska charges nonresidents more for fishing licenses than it does residents. Because
the State can, through oil revenues in the general fund, show a direct relationship between the costs borne by residents in the maintenance of the fisheries management, Alaska can prove that fee differential is merely compensating the State for extra costs created
by nonresident commercial fisherman and putting residents and
nonresidents on equal footing.
Sarah H. Davis

